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This article addresses significant developments in Virginia law
pertaining to air quality, water quality and solid and hazardous
waste which have occurred between the publication of the 1990
survey' and May 1, 1992.
II. AIR
A. Legislation
Comprehensive amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA) were
signed into law on November 15, 1990.2 These amendments
spurred increased activity on the part of Virginia's State Air Pollu-
tion Control Board (Air Board).
The 1991 General Assembly passed legislation authorizing the
Air Board to issue special orders requiring owners to file closure
plans to "abate, control, prevent, remove, or contain any substan-
tial and imminent threat to public health or the environment that
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1. James R. Ryan, Jr., Environmental Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 24 U. RICH.
L. REV. 583 (1990). For a survey of developments in federal environmental law during the
relevant time period, see ABA SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW & UNIVERSITY OF TULSA COLLEGE OF LAW, Natural Resources, Energy and Environ-
mental Law 1991: The Year in Review (1992) [hereinafter 1991 Year in Review] and Natu-
ral Resources, Energy and Environmental Law 1990: The Year in Review (1991)
[hereinafter 1990 Year in Review].
2. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1992)). For a summary of the Clean Air Act Amendments, see
1990 Year in Review, supra note 1, at 149-87.
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is reasonably likely to occur if [the facility] ceases operations. '3
The new statute imposes substantial penalties on any person who
"knowingly and willfully fails to implement a closure plan or to
provide adequate funds" to implement the plan.4 Penalties author-
ized under the amended statute include the costs of "abating, con-
trolling, preventing, removing, or containing" any such threat.
Criminal liability for a Class 4 felony can also attach.5
The 1992 General Assembly passed legislation establishing pre-
liminary permit fees and a permit program fund to cover costs in
processing permits.6 The Department of Air Pollution Control will
base the annual permit program fee on the actual emissions of
each regulated pollutant from the source. Fees will not exceed a
base year amount of twenty-five dollars per ton using 1990 as the
base year. 7 There is a statutory cap of $100,000 per source.' The
statute requires that the fees approximate the costs of administer-
ing and enforcing the permit program and the small business sta-
tionary source technical and environmental compliance assistance
program.'
The small business stationary source technical and environmen-
tal compliance assistance program was created to assist small busi-
ness stationary sources in complying with provisions of the federal
CAA.10 A stationary source is eligible for the program if it:
1) is owned or operated by a person that employs 100 or fewer
individuals;
2) is a small business concern as defined in the Federal Small Bus-
iness Act;
3) is not a major stationary source;
3. Act of Apr. 3, 1991, ch. 702, 1991 Va. Acts 1340 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-
1309.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1309.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
5. Id.
6. Act of Mar. 27, 1992, ch. 488, 1992 Va. Acts 619 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-
1322 to -1322.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1322 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
8. Id. § 10.1-1322.2(C). The statutory cap applies only to preliminary program permit
fees, which are those fees in use until a fee schedule is set up by the Air Board. See id. §§
10.1-1322(A), (C).
9. Id. § 10.1-1322(B).
10. Act of Mar. 17, 1992, ch. 303, 1992 Va. Acts 374 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-
1323 to -1326 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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4) does not emit fifty tons or more per year of any regulated pollu-
tant; and
5) emits less than seventy-five tons per year of all regulated
pollutants. 1
The legislation allows owners of other sources not meeting the
third, fourth, and fifth criteria to petition to be treated as small
stationary sources if the sources do not emit more than 100 tons
per year of all regulated pollutants. 2
The 1992 General Assembly also established an alternative fuels
revolving fund to be used to assist local governments with costs
incurred in the conversion of fuel systems in public vehicles, in-
cluding school buses, to use alternative fuels."3 The purpose of the
fund is to improve air quality in Virginia, reduce dependence on
imported fuels, and stimulate the economy.
B. Administrative Proceedings
The State Air Pollution Control Board promulgated regulations,
effective July 1, 1991, amending the emissions standards for vola-
tile organic compounds.' 4 The regulations contain amendments
which affect the disposal of volatile organic compounds (VOC), the
definition of VOC, exemption levels, compliance time frames, rec-
ord keeping and reporting requirements, control technology re-
quirements for major sources, and other matters.
The Air Board also amended its Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration (PSD) permit regulations effective August 1, 1991.1' The
regulations contain revised definitions of "baseline area," "baseline
concentration," "baseline date," "federally enforceable" and "net
emissions increase.' 6 The amendments add nitrogen dioxide am-
bient air increments for Class I, II and III areas, 7 and revise re-
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1323(B) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
12. Id. § 10.1-1323(C).
13. Acts of Mar. 17 & Mar. 20, 1992, chs. 351 & 389, 1992 Va. Acts 441, 501 (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33.1-223.3 to -223.9 (Cum. Supp. 1992)). An alternative fuel is a motor
fuel used as an alternative to gas and diesel such as ethanol, methanol or electricity.
14. 7:14 Va. Regs. Reg. 2121 (1991). Due to the length of the regulation, the Virginia
Register of Regulations contains only a summary. The full text is available from the Regis-
trar of Regulations or from the agency.
15. 7:20 Va. Regs. Reg. 3011 (1991).
16. Id. at 3012-16.
17. See id. at 3017.
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quirements for approval of innovative control technology sys-
tems.' s The Board amended the noncriteria pollutant rules,
effective October 15, 1991, to establish new significant ambient air
concentrations (SAACs) relating to the chronic and acute health
effect limits established by the American Conference of Govern-
mental Industrial Hygienists handbook."" The previous exemption
tables have been replaced by exemption formulas listed in the
handbook, which are based on assumptions that more accurately
reflect operation of facilities emitting toxic pollutants. Amend-
ments to the regulations clarify the standards section of the rules,
expand the definition of control technology which might be re-
quired for existing facilities, and set compliance requirements for
facilities which emit at levels that produce concentrations signifi-
cantly above the SAAC. 20
Finally, three urban and one rural nonattainment areas were
designated for ozone: Northern Virginia (serious); Richmond (mod-
erate); Hampton Roads (marginal); and White Top Mountain and
Smyth County (marginal - rural transport areas).2'
C. Judicial Activities
1. Federal Courts
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,22 the court re-
jected the plaintiff's challenge to the EPA's May 16, 1990 approval
of a revised State Implementation Plan for American Cyanamid,
which was predicated on bubbling four discreet sources of VOC
emissions from the company's Virginia facilities." The court re-
jected NRDC's contention that such an approach did not comply
with EPA's relevant Emissions Control Techniques Guidelines. 4
The court found that the agency's reliance on its interpretation of
Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT) was reasona-
ble.25 The interpretation was contained in an early guidance docu-
18. See id. at 3025-26.
19. 7:25 Va. Regs. Reg. 4008 (1991).
20. Id.
21. Commonwealth of Virginia, State Air Pollution Control Board, Regulations for the
Control and Abatement of Air Pollution, Appendix K (Jan. 1, 1992).
22. 941 F.2d 1207, No. 90-2447, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19100 (4th Cir. Aug. 19, 1991) (per
curiam) (unpublished decision).
23. Id. at *3.
24. Id. at *12.
25. Id. at *9.
732 [Vol. 26:729
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ment which provided that a RACT determination may vary from
source to source and may apply to "an individual source or group
of sources."26 The court also found EPA's refusal to employ the
bubbling approach in other peculiar instances was not evidence of
arbitrary or capricious decision-making.2 7
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Reilly,28 plaintiff
sought an order compelling the EPA Administrator to promulgate
standards requiring light vehicles to be equipped with onboard re-
fueling vapor recovery systems pursuant to section 202(a)(6), the
light vehicle onboard vapor recovery provisions of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990.29 The plaintiffs contended that this sec-
tion created a nondiscretionary duty to promulgate standards,
while the defendants contended that the section allowed the Ad-
ministrator discretion to determine the desirability of promulgat-
ing such standards based on safety considerations.3 0
Pursuant to section 202(a)(6) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA be-
gan consultation with the Department of Transportation and initi-
ated a rulemaking that culminated, after the suit was filed, in a
final action wherein the EPA concluded that onboard vapor recov-
ery systems should not be required because they pose an unreason-
able risk to public safety.31 The district court dismissed the com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that
section 307(b) (1)32 vests exclusive jurisdiction for judicial review of
a final action taken by the Administrator in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.3 3
In United States v. Economy Muffler & Tire Center, Inc.,34 the
court rejected defendant's argument that EPA was required to
promulgate its catalytic converter tampering enforcement policy as
a regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and
comment rulemaking requirements.3 The court went on to hold
that replacing a three-way converter with a two-way converter is
26. Id. at *6-7.
27. Id. at *8-9.
28. 788 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Va. 1992).
29. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2473 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a)(6)(West
Supp. 1992)).
30. Reilly, 788 F. Supp. at 271.
31. See 57 Fed. Reg. 13,046, 13,220-31 (Apr. 15, 1992).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988).
33. Reilly, 788 F. Supp. at 272.
34. 762 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D. Va. 1991).
35. Id. at 1244; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
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subject to civil penalties under the Clean Air Act because it effec-
tively removes, or renders inoperative, rhodium, without which a
motor vehicle's exhaust system cannot reduce harmful nitrogen ox-
ide emissions. The court further held that while the defendant's
lack of intent to violate the tampering provision could be consid-
ered in mitigation of a civil penalty, the court's penalty assessment
is not predicated upon a showing of willfulness or negligence. 6
2. State Courts
In Citizens for Clean Air v. State Air Pollution Control Board37
an unincorporated association (CCA) appealed when the Circuit
Court for Rockingham County sustained demurrers of the Air
Board and Rockingham Poultry, Inc. The Air Board and Rocking-
ham Poultry challenged plaintiffs' standing to appeal the Air
Board's decision to deny CCA's petition for a formal hearing re-
garding issuance of an air permit to Rockingham Poultry.38 Relying
on Environmental Defense Fund v. State Water Control Board,39
the court of appeals observed that a specific provision for standing
in the agency's basic law controls.40 The court went on to hold that
CCA was not an "owner" within the meaning of the Air Pollution
Control Law, that term being limited to the owner of a "source or
potential source of pollution."'" Therefore CCA was not entitled to
judicial review of a final decision of the Air Board.42
III. SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
A. Legislation
The 1991 General Assembly passed legislation authorizing the
Waste Management Board to enforce provisions of the Southeast
Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact
and established a civil penalty of up to $25,000 per day for a viola-
tion of the provisions of the Compact.43
36. 762 F. Supp. at 1244-45.
37. 13 Va. App. 430, 412 S.E.2d 715 (1991).
38. Id. at 432, 412 S.E.2d at 716.
39. 12 Va. App. 456, 404 S.E.2d 728 (1991); see infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
40. 13 Va. App. at 435-36, 412 S.E.2d at 718-19.
41. Id. at 440, 412 S.E.2d at 721.
42. Id. at 432, 412 S.E.2d at 716.




In 1991, the General Assembly also passed legislation requiring
that all solid waste management facilities be operated under the
direct supervision of a waste management facility operator certi-
fied by the Board for Waste Management Facility Operators by
January 1, 1993."1
In 1992, the General Assembly passed legislation allowing the
Department of Waste Management to grant variances from the re-
quirement that public sanitary landfills comply with leachate col-
lection system regulations by January 1, 1994.45 The General As-
sembly had passed legislation in 1991 which would allow public
sanitary landfills not in compliance with the regulations to operate
until January 1, 1994.46 The 1992 legislation permits the Depart-
ment of Waste Management to grant variances allowing landfills to
operate beyond the deadline if it finds good cause. 47 The 1992 Gen-
eral Assembly also extended the deadline for certain private sani-
tary landfills to comply with the Department of Waste Manage-
ment's regulations requiring liners and leachate collection systems.
Under the new law, private sanitary landfills which were issued an
operating permit prior to December 21, 1988, may be exempt from
complying with the regulations until October 9, 1993, if written no-
tice is given to the Department.48
The 1992 General Assembly also expanded the authority of the
Director of the Department of Waste Management to deny appli-
cations for hazardous waste permits and to revoke, suspend or
amend permits.49 Virginia Code section 10.1-1427(A) was revised to
allow the director to consider whether the permit holder has com-
mitted a violation which
results in a release of harmful substances into the environment, .
poses a threat of release of harmful substances into the environ-
ment,. . . presents a hazard to human health or ... is representa-
44. Act of Mar. 25, 1991, ch. 551, 1991 Va. Acts 947 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-
1408.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
45. Act of Mar. 27, 1992, ch. 505, 1992 Va. Acts 642.
46. Act of Apr. 3, 1991, ch. 658, 1991 Va. Acts 1217.
47. See Act of Mar. 27, 1992, ch. 505, 1992 Va. Acts 642.
48. Act of Apr. 5, 1992, ch. 730, 1992 Va. Acts 1109. A private sanitary landfill is defined
in the act as "any sanitary landfill as defined in ... § 10.1-1400, including, without limita-
tion, all nonhazardous solid waste landfills holding permits from the Department of Waste
Management, other than a sanitary landfill owned or operated by a local government, com-
bination of local governments or public service authority." Id.
49. Act of Mar. 26, 1992, ch. 463, 1992 Va. Acts 595 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-
1426, -1427 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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tive of a pattern of serious or repeated violations which. . . demon-
strates the permittee's disregard for or inability to comply with
applicable laws, regulations or requirements . . .50
In considering whether to deny an application or revoke, suspend
or amend a permit, the director may also take into account
whether any key personnel have been convicted of certain crimes
punishable as felonies. 1
The 1992 General Assembly amended section 10.1-1408.1 of the
Virginia Code to require public hearings in the affected political
subdivision before the Department of Waste Management may is-
sue a permit for the operation of a new sanitary landfill or other
facility for the treatment or storage of nonhazardous solid waste.52
The prior statute required a public hearing by the Department
only when requested by the local governing body.5 3
Other legislation passed by the 1992 General Assembly autho-
rizes counties, cities and towns to prohibit the disposal of leaves
and grass clippings in any public landfill which it operates if the
locality has implemented a composting program.5 4 Another amend-
ment enables counties, cities or towns to provide for removal of
trash and garbage from unkempt property, charge the property
owner for the removal, and, in certain circumstances, place a lien
on the property for any unpaid charges.5
The 1992 General Assembly imposed a moratorium on the issu-
ance of permits for certain infectious waste facilities.56 The legisla-
tion prohibits any person from constructing or expanding a com-
mercial infectious waste facility without first obtaining permits
from the Air and Waste Management Boards. The Air Board and
the Waste Management Board may not issue, review, or approve
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1427(A) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
51. Id. § 10.1-1427(A)(5). The director must consider the nature of the act committed by
key personnel; culpability, if any, of the applicant, the applicant's discipline of key person-
nel; the applicant's compliance with rules, regulations, and permits; the applicant's imple-
mentation of management control to minimize and prevent occurrence of violations; and
mitigation by the applicant. Id.
52. Act of Mar. 16, 1992, ch. 286, 1992 Va. Acts 358 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-
1408.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
54. Act of Apr. 3, 1992, ch. 638, 1992 Va. Acts 934 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-11.5:1
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
55. Act of Apr. 3, 1992, ch. 649, 1992 Va. Acts 956 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-11
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
56. Acts of Apr. 5, 1992, chs. 751, 773-74, 1992 Va. Acts 1151, 1206, 1208.
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permits for the construction or expansion of commercial infectious
waste facilities until the effective date of regulations these boards
are required to promulgate or September 1, 1993, whichever is
earlier.
The General Assembly also created the Virginia Solid Waste or
Recycling Revolving Fund.57 The fund is to be established from"sums appropriated to the fund by the General Assembly" and
used to make loans or grants to local governments to finance or
refinance the cost of any solid waste management facility or re-
cycling facility. Preference will be given to those programs which
involve private industry or serve more than one locality. 58
B. Administrative Proceedings
The Department of Waste Management updated the Virginia
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations in accordance with
changes made by the Environmental Protection Agency between
January of 1989 and July of 1990.59 The amendments, which were
effective July 1, 1991, incorporate by reference federal regulations
which include restrictions on land disposal of certain wastes,
changes in the descriptions of certain listed wastes, revision of the
toxicity characteristic, and adoption of standards limiting air emis-
sions at permitted hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal
facilities.60
The Department of Waste Management issued Yard Waste
Composting Facility Regulations which became effective January
29, 1992.61 The regulations exempt yard waste composting facilities
from the permitting requirements of Part VII of the Solid Waste
Management Regulations.6 2 The goal of the regulations is to en-
courage the development of yard waste composting facilities by
57. Act of Mar. 19, 1992, ch. 378, 1992 Va. Acts 485 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-
230.1, -239.1, -241.1 to -241.10 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
58. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-230.1, -239.1 (Repl. Vol 1992).
59. 7:16 Va. Regs. Reg. 2363 (1991). Due to the length of the regulation, only a summary
is published in the Register. The full text is available from the agency.
60. Id. at 2363-64.
61. 8:7 Va. Regs. Reg. 1139 (1992). The regulation defines "yard waste" as "that fraction
of municipal solid waste that consists of grass clippings, leaves, brush and tree prunings
arising from general landscape maintenance." Id. at 1141.
62. Id. at 1140. The Department of Waste Management had promulgated an emergency
regulation exempting yard waste composting facilities from the permitting requirements of
Part VII of the Solid Waste Management Regulations which were effective from September
10, 1990 to September 10, 1991. 7:1 Va. Regs. Reg. 111 (1990).
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"establishing technical standards and permitting procedures more
consistent with the environmental risks posed by such facilities. '8 3
The regulations provide standards for siting, design, construction,
and closure and provide for permits by rule to operators of yard
waste composting facilities. 4
C. Judicial Activities
1. Federal Courts
Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion6 5 arose out of Montgomery County, Maryland's attempt to de-
sign a solid waste incinerator whose heat would generate electric-
ity, which would, in turn, be sold to defray the costs of municipal
waste disposal. Petitioner argued that the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC) should have conducted a review of the
environmental impact of the facility under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) e6 and the impact of the facility
on historic structures under the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA)6 7 before granting the incinerator certification as a qualify-
ing small power production facility under section 210 of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA)6 8 FERC denied these re-
quests in its certification, ruling that certification under PURPA
was neither a "major federal action" under NEPA nor a "federal
undertaking" under NHPA.69 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, reason-
ing that a review of whether the applicability of NEPA is reasona-
ble under the circumstances is implicit in an agency's determina-
tion that its actions do not constitute "major federal action. '70 The
court found that: (1) FERC did not have discretion to deny certifi-
cation to any facility which meets the enumerated criteria under
PURPA, (2) FERC certification was merely ministerial, and (3) the
facility could have opted for self-certification. 71 Therefore, the
court concluded, FERC's determination that certification of the fa-
63. 8:7 Va. Regs. Reg. at 1141.
64. Id.
65. 959 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1992).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1988).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1988).
69. Sugarloaf Citizens, 959 F.2d at 511-12.
70. Id. at 512 (citing Goos v. ICC, 911 F.2d 1283, 1291-92 (8th Cir. 1990); Winnebago
Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980); Minnesota Pub.
Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974)).
71. Sugarloaf Citizens, 959 F.2d at 512-13.
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cility was not a "major federal action" under NEPA was reasona-
ble.72 Similarly, since NHPA, "by its terms, has a narrow reach
and is triggered only if a federal agency has the authority to license
a project or approve expenditures for it," the court agreed with
FERC's finding that its certification of the facility was not a fed-
eral "undertaking" within the meaning of NHPA.73
In Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina,74 a
national association of licensed commercial hazardous waste treat-
ment, sludge and disposal (TSD) firms sought a preliminary in-
junction of a number of state executive orders, statutes and regula-
tions which would (1) require South Carolina TSD facilities to give
preference to accepting hazardous wastes generated in that state
and (2) prohibit the in-state treatment of waste generated in states
that had not entered into an interstate or regional agreement pur-
suant to CERCLA. 75 The district court granted a preliminary in-
junction, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that the
laws constituted an unlawful economic barrier in violation of the
commerce clause, 76 and remanded the case for modification of the
order of relief. 7
In a related matter, the Sierra Club sought to intervene in the
litigation in support of the validity of the South Carolina laws. In
In Re Sierra Club,78 the court observed that South Carolina, "con-
cerned with the overall constitutionality of various aspects of its
hazardous waste program, cannot be an adequate representative of
environmental groups concerned with a regulation's use in the per-
mitting process. ' 79 The court remanded the Sierra Club's motion
to intervene to the district court.80
In United States v. Dee,81 U.S. Army civilian employees in-
volved in the development of chemical warfare systems at Aber-
deen Proving Ground appealed from their convictions of multiple
violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's
72. Id. at 514.
73. Id. (quoting Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F.2d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
74. 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991).
75. Id. at 785-86.
76. Id. at 787.
77. Id. at 795.
78. 945 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1991).
79. Id. at 780.
80. Id. at 781.
81. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
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(RCRA) criminal provisions.2 The defendants were responsible for
assuring that the facility was in compliance with both RCRA and
the facility's own internally promulgated policies and operating
procedures relating to hazardous waste management.83 At trial, the
jury found that the individual in charge of operations at Aberdeen:
(1) ordered placement of hazardous chemicals in a storage shed, (2)
repeatedly ignored warnings about the hazardous conditions of the
chemicals that were improperly stored, and (3) undertook no ac-
tions to comply with RCRA in storage and disposal of chemicals.
The jury further found that the defendants engaged in unpermit-
ted dumping and incineration of hazardous wastes.84
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that federal
employees working at a federal facility are "persons" subject to
RCRA's criminal provisions. The employees were charged with
criminal liability in their individual capacities, rather than as
agents of the government, and sovereign immunity does not attach
to individual government employees so as to immunize them from
prosecution for their criminal acts.85 The court further held that
the defendants "knowingly" violated criminal provisions of RCRA,
even if they did not know that violation of RCRA was a crime or
that regulations existed listing and identifying chemical wastes as
hazardous wastes under RCRA, where there was evidence that the
defendants were aware that they were dealing with hazardous
chemicals, and evidence that "materials handled by defendants
were "wastes" within the meaning of RCRA. 8
In United States v. Jude,87 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's refusal to reduce a $75,000 civil and $500 criminal
penalty imposed under RCRA upon the chief executive officer of a
company for allowing a tank containing hazardous waste to be
transported without a permit. Because the sentence was within the
statutory guidelines and no exceptional circumstances or abuse of
discretion had been shown, the appellate court had no authority to
reduce the sentence.88
82. Id. at 743.
83. Id. at 744.
84. Id. at 746-48.
85. Id. at 744.
86. Id. at 746-47; see Solid Waste Disposal Act § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (West
Supp. 1992).
87. 914 F.2d 249 (unpublished opinion), 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,373 (4th
Cir. Sept. 12, 1990).
88. Id. at 20,374.
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In Aliff v. Joy Manufacturing Co., 9 the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's determination that the doctrine of res judicata
barred a response cost recovery action under CERCLA. The plain-
tiff had previously brought an action against the defendant for
fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the sale of a build-
ing contaminated with PCBs, and the purchaser plaintiff appar-
ently possessed sufficient information to construct a theory of re-
covery under CERCLA in the previous action.90
In Richland-Lexington Airport District v. Atlas Properties,
Inc.,9 1 the plaintiff contracted with the defendant to dump waste
on the plaintiff's property. The court held that this did not pre-
clude the plaintiff from asserting a cost recovery action against the
defendant under CERCLA, and, reversing the lower court's dismis-
sal of the cost recovery claim, held that consistency with the Na-
tional Contingency Plan does not require prior government
approval.92
In Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Davis
Industries, Inc.,93 a defendant in a CERCLA cost recovery action
filed a third party claim against the manufacturer of air condition-
ers which the defendant allegedly sent to the plaintiff's scrap re-
cycling and disposal site, claiming contribution and indemnity
under state law theories of negligence and strict liability. The court
partially granted the third party defendant's motion for summary
judgment, dismissing the strict liability claim. The court held,
however, that while the destruction of the manufacturer's air con-
ditioners for recycling purposes could not have been reasonably
foreseen, a jury could find that it was reasonably foreseeable that
the air conditioners would normally be handled and stored after
their serviceable lives and therefore the manufacturer had a duty
to warn of the possible release of hazardous substances during such
handling and storage. 5
In Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co. v.
Clarke,96 the plaintiff, seeking recovery of CERCLA response costs,
89. 914 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1990).
90. Id. at 43-44.
91. 901 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1990).
92. Id. at 1208-09.
93. 787 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Va. 1992).
94. Id. at 576.
95. Id. at 578. The indemnity claim was dismissed for defendant/third party plaintiff's
failure to identify a contractual basis for indemnification. Id.
96. No. 90-00336, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15829 (E.D. Va. Jan. 22, 1991).
1992] 741
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
moved to strike the jury demand 97 and affirmative defenses (con-
tributory negligence, assumption of risk, estoppel, unclean hands,
waiver, laches, failure to mitigate, unjust enrichment, no joint and
several liability, offset, release, and apportionment) 98 filed by de-
fendant Clarke. The district court held that because the plaintiff
sought essentially equitable relief on its response cost recovery
claim under CERCLA, the defendant was not entitled to a jury
trial on that claim. The court observed that section 113 of CER-
CLA, which explicitly provides that the court must resolve such a
claim based on equitable factors, governed the plaintiff's claim for
contribution.9 The court further ruled that defenses to CERCLA
actions are limited to those defenses that the statute itself
specifies. 100
In Disston Co. v. Sandvik, Inc.,10 1 the court held that the plain-
tiff's CERCLA cost recovery claims were subject to mandatory ar-
bitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the purchase agree-
ment.102 The court further held that purchaser had no right to
withhold payment on a note to the seller in light of the environ-
mental contamination on the property. 0 3
In City of Chesapeake v. Sutton Enterprises, Inc., 04 an action
removed from the Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake, the
district court, adopting the U.S. magistrate's findings, held that
neither the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) or CERCLA
preempted the city's state court enforcement action ordering
cleanup of PCB contaminated property pursuant to city ordinance
and the state fire code.
Finally, in a significant bankruptcy decision, In re Doyle Lum-
ber, Inc.,05 the chapter seven trustee filed a notice stating his in-
tention to abandon the bankruptcy estate's interest in a sawmill
and wood treating facility because due to "the use of the chemical
compound chromated copper arsenate in the wood treating process
at the plant for many years, there may be environmental damage
97. Id. at *7.
98. Id. at *11.
99. Id. at *9-*10.
100. Id. at *11-*12.
101. 750 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Va. 1990).
102. Id. at 748-49.
103. Id. at 749-50.
104. 138 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Va. 1990).
105. 137 B.R. 197 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992).
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to the property where the plant was located . . -. 01 The pro-
posed abandonment was objected to by the first lien holder, by the
Virginia Department of Waste Management, and by the State
Water Control Board. The bankruptcy court determined that the
facts did not reveal an immediate threat to the health and safety
of the public and allowed abandonment. 0 7
2. State Courts
In Ticonderoga Farms v. County of Loudoun,0 8 the Virginia Su-
preme Court held that Loudoun County's regulation of solid waste
was not specifically preempted by state regulations in the area and
was not in conflict with existing state law. 09 The court further
held that organic materials such as tree prunings, stumps, brush
and the like, which were accepted by the plaintiff for a fee, consti-
tuted "discarded material" and thus a "solid waste" as defined in
the Virginia Waste Management Act."' The material was not ex-
empt from regulation under the recycling exception"' because the
material lay above the ground indefinitely and had no immediate
use.112
D. Attorney General Opinions
The Attorney General opined that the definition of "solid waste"
in the Virginia Waste Management Act" 3 does not include "haz-
ardous waste," and that therefore the provision of the Virginia
106. Id. at 199.
107. Id. at 202-03. The court noted that in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dept.
of Envtl. Protection, the United States Supreme Court held that, despite the literal lan-
guage of the bankruptcy code, when Congress enacted § 554(a) it did not grant the trustee
the right to "abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is rea-
sonably designed to protect public health or safety from identified hazards." Doyle Lumber,
137 B.R. at 201 (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986)). Reasoning that
the Fourth Circuit had interpreted this exception narrowly, applying the exception only
"where there is a serious health risk, not where the hazards are speculative" and that the
financial condition of the debtor is relevant to the Midlantic analysis, the bankruptcy court
determined that the unique facts of the case did not reveal an immediate danger to the
public and that the costs of the soil and water testing requested by the state agencies would
exceed any funds in the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 201-03.
108. 242 Va. 170, 409 S.E.2d 446 (1991).
109. Id. at 175, 409 S.E.2d at 449.
110. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1400 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.1(J) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
112. Ticonderoga Farms, 242 Va. at 176, 409 S.E.2d at 449.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1410 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
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Code authorizing any county, city or town to enact ordinances reg-
ulating the siting of solid waste management facilities within its
boundaries".4 does not grant a local government authority to pass




The 1991 General Assembly passed legislation authorizing the
State Water Control Board to issue special orders requiring owners
to file closure plans "to abate, control, prevent, remove, or contain
any substantial and imminent threat to public health or the envi-
ronment that is reasonably likely to occur if the facility ceases op-
erations.""' The new statute imposes substantial penalties on any
person who knowingly and willfully fails to implement a closure
plan or who fails to provide adequate funds to implement the plan.
Penalties authorized under the new statute include the costs of
abating, controlling, preventing, removing or containing any such
threat. Criminal liability for a Class 4 felony can also attach.
The 1991 General Assembly passed legislation enabling the State
Department of Health to authorize the construction and operation
of sewerage systems and sewage treatment works. 17 However, if
the system or treatment works will have a potential or actual dis-
charge to state waters, the owner must first apply for a certificate
from the State Water Control Board. Once a certificate has been
issued by the Board, the owner must obtain authorization from the
State Department of Health to erect, construct, open, expand or
operate a sewerage system or sewage treatment works.
Legislation allowing localities to adopt stormwater control pro-
grams by establishing a utility or enacting a system of service
charges took effect on July 1, 1991.118 The statute permits a local-
ity administering a stormwater control program to recover the
costs associated with planning, design, land acquisition, construc-
114. Id. § 15.1-11.02(A).
115. Op. to Hon. William L. Heartwell (Jan. 27, 1992).
116. Act of Apr. 3, 1991, ch. 702, 1991 Va. Acts 1340 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-
44.15:1.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
117. Act of Mar. 13, 1991, ch. 194, 1991 Va. Acts 263 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-
44.19 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-292.4 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
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tion, operation and maintenance activities. Costs for the program
may be recovered from property owners based upon their contribu-
tions to stormwater runoff.
The 1992 General Assembly enacted the Groundwater Manage-
ment Act,11 authorizing the State Water Control Board to issue
groundwater withdrawal permits in accordance with regulations to
be developed and adopted by the Board. 20 The new statute per-
mits the Board to initiate study proceedings of groundwater man-
agement areas when the Board may have reason to believe that:
(1) groundwater levels in an area are declining or are expected to
decline excessively;
(2) the wells of two or more groundwater users within the area are
interfering or may reasonably be expected to interfere substantially
with one another;
(3) the available groundwater supply has been or may be over-
drawn; or
(4) groundwater in the area has been or may become polluted. 2'
If any of these conditions are found to exist and the public wel-
fare, safety and health require that regulatory efforts be initiated,
the Board must designate the area as a groundwater management
area.'22 Permits are required for the withdrawal of groundwater in
a management area. 23 The issuance of permits must be based on
actual and historical withdrawals by the user'2 4 and each permit
will have a ten-year term.'2 5
Local governments may now authorize fire marshals to investi-
gate contamination of groundwater, surface water, or subsurface
soil caused by a release, or upon reasonable suspicion of a release,
119. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 812, 1992 Va. Acts 1295 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-
254 to -270 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-256 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
121. Id. "Such pollution includes any alteration of the physical, chemical or biological
properties of groundwater which has a harmful or detrimental effect on the quality or quan-
tity of the water." Id. § 62.1-257(A)(4).
122. Id. § 62.1-257(B).
123. Id. § 62.1-258.
124. Id. § 62.1-260.
125. Id. § 62.1-266(C).
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of hazardous material or regulated substances and to determine
the origin and source of the release. 2 '
Any person who owns or operates an injection well in a manner
that causes contamination or diminution of groundwater used for a
beneficial use by any person within a one-quarter mile radius of
the injection well may now be required to provide a replacement
water supply of the same quality and quantity. 2 '
The 1992 General Assembly also passed legislation requiring the
Water Board to promulgate regulations to prevent pollution of
state waters from aboveground storage tanks. 2 ' The regulations
developed by the Board are to be aimed at preventing leaks and
overfills. 2 " Documentation of monitoring and testing for leaks will
be required.'30 For aboveground tanks with an aggregate capacity
of one million gallons or greater, formal tank inspections will be
required every five years. 131 The Board is to compile an inventory
of facilities with aboveground storage capacity of more than 1320
gallons of oil or individual aboveground storage tanks with a stor-
age capacity of more than 660 gallons of oil.'32 After the regula-
tions are effective, operators will have ninety days to register their
facility with the Board and local coordinator of emergency
services.133
Also relating to oil discharge, the General Assembly passed legis-
lation which permits political subdivisions to recover costs and ex-
penses incurred to investigate, contain, and clean up a discharge of
oil from an underground storage tank into state waters, lands, or
storm drain systems.13 4
126. Act of Apr. 4, 1992, ch. 712, 1992 Va. Acts 1082 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 27-37.1
(Repl. Vol. 1992)).
127. Act of Mar. 17, 1992, ch. 324, 1992 Va. Acts 410 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-
361.41 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
128. Act of Mar. 24, 1992, ch. 456, 1992 Va. Acts 583 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-
44.34:14.1, :15.1, :19.1, :19.2 (Repl. Vol. 1992)). The bill defines "aboveground storage tank"
as "any one tank or combination of tanks, including pipes, used to contain an accumulation
of oil at atmospheric pressure, and the volume of which ... is more than ninety percent
above the surface of the ground." VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:14 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:15.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
130. Id. § 62.1-44.34:19(B).
131. Id. § 62.1-44.34:15.1.
132. Id. § 62.1-44.34:19.1(A).
133. Id. § 62.1-44.34:19(B).
134. Act of Mar. 24, 1992, ch. 456, 1992 Va. Acts 538 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-
44.34:18 (Repl. Vol. 1992)). Recovery is allowed for costs and expenses directly incurred for





The State Water Control Board issued a final regulation effec-
tive July 18, 1990,111 and an emergency regulation in 1992,111 to
comply with section 303(c)(2)(B) of the federal Clean Water Act,
which requires water quality standards to be adopted for section
307(a) toxic pollutants. The 1990 regulation sets numerical limits
for specific physical, chemical and biological characteristics of
water. The regulation also adds numerical limits on dioxin to pro-
tect against consumption of contaminated water and aquatic orga-
nisms.137 The emergency regulation, effective February 7, 1992, to
February 6, 1993, sets standards for surface water to control toxic
pollutants and includes numerical standards for the protection of
aquatic life and human health. The regulation also amends the
anti-degradation policy section to conform with federal regulations
regarding water quality standards. 8
The Water Board has also promulgated regulations establishing
the procedures to be followed in order to obtain a Virginia Water
Protection Permit (VWPP) issued pursuant to section 62.1-44.2 of
the Virginia Code and section 401 of the federal Clean Water
Act.""9 The regulations require a VWPP "to be issued for activities
that result in a discharge to surface waters, that require a federal
permit or license, and are not permitted under the Virginia Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System .... "I Conditions imposed
on a VWPP relate to dredge and fill material and restrictions on
the amount and times of water withdrawals by stream intakes, res-
ervoirs, and hydroelectric facilities, and are designed to protect the
beneficial uses of state waters.
The Water Board also promulgated regulations requiring the
submission and approval of oil discharge contingency plans. The
final regulations, effective January 29, 1992, apply to all facilities
in Virginia which have an aggregate aboveground maximum stor-
age or handling capacity equal to or greater than 25,000 gallons,
and to all tank vessels which have a maximum capacity equal to or
135. 6:19 Va. Regs. Reg. 3085 (1990).
136. 8:12 Va. Regs. Reg. 2034 (1992).
137. 6:19 Va. Regs. Reg. at 3085.
138. 8:12 Va. Regs. Reg. at 2034.
139. 8:15 Va. Regs. Reg. 2454 (1992).
140. Id.
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greater than 15,000 gallons and which transport or transfer oil
upon state waters. 141
The Water Board also adopted regulations, effective January 29,
1992, which require operators of tank vessels transporting or trans-
ferring oil upon state waters having maximum storage, handling or
transporting capacity equal to or greater than 15,000 gallons of oil
to establish their financial responsibility. 142 The regulations are in-
tended to assure that the operator has the necessary financial re-
sources to conduct the proper response to a discharge of oil.
Water Board regulations effective July 1, 1992, provide for the
issuance of a general permit for domestic sewage discharges of less
than or equal to 1000 gallons per day. 43 The regulation "estab-
lishes standard limitations and monitoring requirements for efflu-
ents discharged by all facilities covered by the VPDES General
Permit."1 44
Finally, the Water Board issued regulations, effective June 3,
1992, that delineate the procedures to be followed to establish Sur-
face Water Management Areas and to issue surface water with-
drawal permits and surface water withdrawal certificates. 145 The
regulations do not apply to nonconsumptive users, withdrawals of
less than 300,000 gallons of water per month, or withdrawals from
wastewater treatment systems. Surface Water Management Areas
will be established by separate regulations. In those areas, water
users in existence as of July 1, 1989, are required to apply for a
withdrawal certificate containing a Board-approved water conser-
vation or management plan. Water users in existence after July
1989 must apply for a withdrawal permit containing withdrawal




In James City County v. EPA, 46 the Fourth Circuit considered
the district court's rejection of EPA's request for a remand to the
141. 8:7 Va. Regs. Reg. 1147 (1992).
142. 8:7 Va. Regs. Reg. 1160 (1992).
143. 8:17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2861 (1992).
144. Id.
145. 8:16 Va. Regs. Reg. 2641 (1992).
146. 955 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1992).
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agency. EPA requested a remand after James City County ap-
pealed EPA's veto of the Army Corps of Engineer's decision to is-
sue the county a permit to construct a reservoir under section
404(a) of the Clean Water Act.147 The EPA vetoed the Corps' deci-
sion under section 404(c) 48 based on a finding that there were al-
ternatives to the proposed reservoir which would create less ad-
verse impact on the ecosystem. 14 9 After holding that the EPA's
veto was improper, the district court ordered the Corps to issue the
permit. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the "substantial
evidence" standard of review applied to the EPA's section 404(c)
determination, 150 and ruled that the EPA's finding that the County
had practicable alternative water sources was not supported by
substantial evidence.' 5 ' Partially affirming the district court's judg-
ment on this issue, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless remanded the
case to the district court for further remand to EPA for the
agency's consideration of a veto based on adverse environmental
effects alone, an issue upon which the agency had yet to rule.152
In United States v. Ellen,153 the Fourth Circuit affirmed a crimi-
nal conviction and sentence under the Clean Water Act for im-
properly filling wetlands. The defendant unsuccessfully argued at
trial that his conviction was unconstitutional because some govern-
ment witnesses based their conclusions that the areas filled were
wetlands on the 1989 federal wetlands identification manual,'15
while the conduct for which he was convicted occurred in 1987 and
1988.115 Because the 1989 manual was an interpretive guide rather
than a legislative rule, and because the regulatory definition of
wetlands had not changed since 1977 and was the definition used
147. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a)(West 1986). The district court's opinion was published at 758
F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Va. 1990).
148. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(c)(West 1986).
149. James City County, 955 F.2d at 258.
150. Id. at 259. But see Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 46 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1089 (1989) (reviewing a § 404(c) veto decision by the EPA under the arbitrary and
capricious standard). The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that the same conclusion would be
reached under either standard. James City County, 955 F.2d at 259 n.5.
151. James City County, 955 F.2d at 259-60.
152. Id. at 260. The court was "heavily influenced" by EPA's "unequivocal representa-
tion" at oral argument that the agency would complete its determination on remand within
60 days of the court's decision and admonished that it would "view seriously any failure to
comply with that representation." Id.
153. 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1992).
154. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COMM. FOR WETLAND DELINEATION, FEDERAL MANUAL FOR
IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS 1 (1989).
155. Ellen, 961 F.2d at 465.
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in the jury instructions, the Fourth Circuit held that the manual
was not a "law" within the meaning of the ex post facto clause.'56
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Watkins,15 7 a case in-
volving the adequacy of plaintiff association's allegation of repre-
sentational standing, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district
court's determination that affidavits submitted by individual mem-
bers of the association did not allege with sufficient specificity that
the affiants utilized portions of the Savannah River affected by a
proposed discharge from a nuclear reactor. 158
Distinguishing the facts of the case from those in Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Federation,59 the Fourth Circuit held that the dis-
trict court was not required to assume any particularized geo-
graphical usage by the affiants in order to establish the injury
necessary to confer standing.160 The Fourth Circuit also rejected
the district court's reasoning that the defendant was entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of standing because, while the pro-
posed discharge would exceed its National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit thermal effluent limitations
at the point of discharge, water temperature would be within the
permit limitation at the point the effluent ultimately leaves the
federal facility and enters the publicly accessible portion of the Sa-
vannah River. 6' The court held that the allegations of adverse de-
rivative consequences of on-site wetlands destruction created a
material issue of fact regarding the potential for cognizable harm
to the Savannah River.' 62
156. Id. at 464-65. The defendant's due process challenge to his conviction for knowingly
filling in wetlands was rejected on the grounds that there was substantial evidence for the
jury to conclude that he possessed actual knowledge that he was filling in wetlands and thus
defendant had "fair warning" that he was subject to the Clean Water Act's criminal penal-
ties. Id. at 466-67.
In an earlier unpublished opinion, wherein the Fourth Circuit found that the Clean Water
Act confers upon EPA independent enforcement authority over § 404 violations, the court
held that the EPA's wetlands delineation manuals were created to provide interpretive guid-
ance, not to expand federal jurisdiction. Hobbs v. United States, 947 F.2d 941 (unpublished
decision), 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,331, 20,333 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1991).
157. 954 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1992).
158. Id. at 979.
159. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
160. Watkins, 954 F.2d at 979.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 980. The appellate court reversed the district court's imposition of summary
judgment and remanded the case for a factual hearing on the issue of standing. The Fourth
Circuit further affirmed the district court's refusal to issue a preliminary injunction and
refused to issue declaratory judgment until the standing issue is resolved. Id. at 984.
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Two cases arose out of the continuing efforts of Virginia Beach
to effect a sixty million-gallon-per-day interbasin transfer of water
from the Roanoke River basin. The city proposes to construct an
eighty-five mile, 240 million-gallons-per-day pipeline from Lake
Gaston in Brunswick County, Virginia.163 The Fourth Circuit con-
sidered the scope of involvement by the Army Corps of Engineers
and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in the project in both
cases.
In Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson,64 the Court upheld
the Corps' modification of the project permit to require mainte-
nance of preconstruction flows during bass spawning season.6 5 The
court found that the Corps was not arbitrary and capricious in
finding (1) the project posed no significant impact on water qual-
ity, (2) no cumulative adverse environmental impact, and (3) no
reasonably foreseeable increased need for water consumption in
North Carolina. 6 Therefore, an environmental impact statement
was not required under the National Environmental Policy Act. 6 7
In North Carolina v. Virginia Beach,"6 8 the Fourth Circuit held
that where the Corps has completed an environmental review of a
project and construction has already begun, further construction
on portions of the project outside FERC jurisdiction may not be
delayed until FERC completes its review of the environmental im-
pact of the project as a whole.6"
In a case dealing with issues of ripeness and the EPA's authority
under the Clean Water Act, the Fourth Circuit held in West Vir-
ginia Coal Ass'n v. Reilly170 that EPA could use an internal policy
as a basis for objecting to draft NPDES permits which utilized sur-
face coal mine related fills and in-stream treatment ponds.''
163. See Ryan, supra note 1, at 599-601; Ron Brown, Payne's Water Fight No Joke:
Southside Fears Pipeline to Virginia Beach, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD-NEWS, June 11,
1992 at 1.
164. 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991).
165. Id. at 61-62.
166. Id. at 64-66.
167. Id.
168. 951 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1991).
169. Id. at 605.
170. 932 F.2d 964 (unpublished opinion), 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,092 (4th
Cir. May 13, 1991).
171. 22 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,094.
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In Southern Pines Associates v. United States,"2 the Fourth
Circuit held that judicial review of a compliance order under sec-
tion 301 of the CWA for illegally discharging into wetlands was
precluded prior to enforcement action or imposition of penalties."'
In P.H. Glatfelter Co. v. EPA,174 the Fourth Circuit reviewed the
EPA's placement of (1) a North Carolina pulp and paper mill on a
list of point sources discharging toxic pollutants believed to be im-
pairing attainment of state standards and (2) a portion of the
French Board River located downstream from the mill on a list of
waters not likely to meet North Carolina's water quality stan-
dards."' The court found EPA's action to be a preliminary step
which preceded permanent modification proceedings and not the
promulgation of an individual control strategy for which judicial
review was available. 76
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,' 77 plaintiffs
claimed that the EPA Administrator capriciously approved Mary-
land's ambient water quality standard for benzene and that the
Administrator violated his nondiscretionary duty under the CWA
to develop and revise fully EPA's water quality criteria for dioxin
to reflect the latest scientific knowledge about dioxin. Following
earlier litigation between the parties, EPA developed dioxin water
quality criteria documents and found insufficient data to develop a
national criteria for the effects of dioxin on aquatic toxicity. In
1989, Maryland adopted a 1.2 parts per quadrillion standard for
dioxin, which was approved by EPA. 78 In April of 1990, EPA pub-
lished regulations indicating that it would continue to adopt a
0.013 parts per quadrillion dioxin water quality standard when it
was responsible for adopting quality standards. 79 The court held
that section 1313(c)(2)(B) s0 explicitly contemplates EPA adoption
of non-numerical criteria for toxics and authorizes states to adopt
172. 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990).
173. Id. at 716. In Hampton Venture No. One v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 174 (E.D.
Va. 1991), the district court reviewed a line of decisions by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
and the District Court of Delaware before holding that pre-enforcement compliance or cease
and desist orders issued by EPA or the Corps under the Clean Water Act are not judicially
reviewable. Id. at 175.
174. 921 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1990).
175. Id. at 516-17.
176. Id. at 517-18.
177. 770 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Va. 1991).
178. See id. at 1095.
179. Id. at 1094.
180. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B) (1988).
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criteria based on other methods consistent with EPA published
guidelines. 81
In Arlington Forest Associates v. Exxon Corp.,82 the district
court determined that the Virginia Supreme Court, if presented
with the issue, would hold that the storage and removal of gasoline
in underground tanks is not an abnormally dangerous activity for
which common law strict liability should be imposed.' 83
2. Virginia State Courts
Several cases arose in the context of the State Water Control
Law dealing with the issue of standing.18 4 In Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Water Control Board,8 5 the court of appeals held
that where the basic law contains a specific standing requirement,
this requirement controls over the standardized court review pro-
cedures set forth in the Virginia Administrative Process Act
(VAPA).' 86 The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) had unsuc-
cessfully challenged in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond
both (1) the Board's use of an internal memorandum authorizing
regional offices to issue flow-tiered permits when issuing an
amended permit and (2) the Board's denial of EDF's request for a
formal hearing following the Board's grant of such an amended
permit to a poultry processing plant.' 87
The court of appeals reasoned that under the State Water Con-
trol Law'8 8 only an "owner aggrieved" has standing, and "owner" is
defined to mean the individuals or groups that control an actual or
potential discharge.' 9 Although the VAPA allows a "party ag-
grieved" to appeal a case decision, the court of appeals held that
181. NRDC, 770 F. Supp. at 1100.
182. 774 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Va. 1991).
183. Id. at 391.
184. For a comprehensive discussion on the law of standing as applied to appeals from
Virginia administrative agencies, see Brian L. Buniva, Recent Developments in Virginia Ad-
ministrative Law, Address Before the Winter Meeting of the Virginia Bar Association (Jan.
18, 1992) (on file with the U. RICH. L. REV.). For a Note urging enactment of a legislative
standing provision in Virginia, see W. Scott Magargee, Note, Protecting the Environment:
Creating a Citizen Standing-to-Sue Statute in Virginia, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 235 (1991).
185. 12 Va. App. 456, 404 S.E.2d 728 (1991).
186. Id. at 462, 404 S.E.2d at 732.
187. Id. at 459, 404 S.E.2d at 730.
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
189. EDF, 12 Va. App. at 465, 404 S.E.2d at 733.
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"case decision" is not defined to include a denial of a request for a
formal hearing. 90
Similarly, in Town of Fries v. State Water Control Board,191 va-
rious individuals and organizations challenged the State Water
Control Board's issuance of an amended VPDES permit to the
City of Galax to build an enlarged sewage treatment plant up-
stream from petitioners. The trial court held that petitioners were
neither "parties aggrieved" under the VAPA nor "owners ag-
grieved" under the State Water Control Law. 92 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the circuit court's granting of the Board's demurrer,
relying on Environmental Defense Fund v. State Water Control
Board.9 3
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Virginia State Water Con-
trol Board,94 the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond held that
a water quality standard adopted by the State Water Control
Board is a regulation for the purposes of the Administrative Pro-
cess Act. Applying the standing test enunciated in Sierra Club v.
Morton,96 the court found that downstream riparian owners are
persons affected by water quality standards. 9 '
In a subsequent proceeding the plaintiffs sought a stay of the
Board's decision to amend Westvaco's VPDES permit. 9 7 The
court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the harm from dioxin ef-
fluent is irreparable, reasoning that any delay in the permitting
process would exacerbate this harm because the company would, in
the interim, not be subject to any dioxin limitations.19 Following
this, the plaintiffs challenged the adoption of a water quality stan-
dard for dioxin on the grounds that it did not comport with the
State Water Control Law. The court held that the Board properly
used EPA calculation methodologies and reasonably accounted for
190. Id. at 464, 404 S.E.2d at 733.
191. 13 Va. App. 213, 409 S.E.2d 634 (1991).
192. Id. at 215, 409 S.E.2d at 636.
193. Id. at 215-17, 409 S.E.2d at 636-37. On October 25, 1990, the Circuit Court of Fairfax
County held that only "owners" as defined in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.16, .17 and .19
(Repl. Vol. 1992) have standing to petition for a public hearing on the reissuance of a
VPDES permit pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.25 (Repl. Vol. 1992). Herrity v. Water
Control Board, 21 Va. Cir. 422, 423 (Fairfax County 1990).
194. 22 Va. Cir. 412 (Richmond City 1991).
195. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
196. EDF, 22 Va. Cir. at 415-16.
197. 25 Va. Cir. 64 (Richmond City 1991).
198. Id. at 65.
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other factors in its determination of the standard. 99 Finally, the
court denied EDF's motion for reconsideration of the court's ruling
on the propriety of the establishment of a water quality standard
for dioxin, again finding that the Board achieved the purposes of
the State Water Control Law and acted within its legislative
authority.20 0
In State Water Control Board v. Appalachian Power Co.
(APCo),20 ' the Board petitioned the court of appeals for a rehear-
ing of a panel's earlier ruling affirming the trial court's invalidation
of the Board's chlorine water quality standard.0 2
APCo argued that new regulations since promulgated by the
Board rendered the validity of the challenged regulations moot,
and sought its attorneys' fees under the Act.203 The court affirmed
its earlier decision and held that the Board's adoption of supersed-
ing regulations did not moot whether the regulations originally
challenged were valid and whether they controlled the extent of
discharge into state waters from the date of their enactment until
the effective date of the new regulations.0 4 The court found that
the "same controversy which existed between the parties" through-
out the litigation still existed as a "viable and justiciable issue. '20 5
The court further recognized that even where the parties no longer
have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the litigation, a
court may proceed to adjudicate a controversy under the "capable
of repetition, but evading review" exception to the requirements
for standing or justiciability.2 6 The court went on to note that the
validity of regulations from other agencies which must also con-
form with the requirements of the Virginia Administrative Proce-
dure Act may have been called into question by the earlier panel
decision:
While other agencies who are not a party to this proceeding and
their regulations are not in issue, the SWCB and APCo, as well as
other agencies, have a real interest in having a resolution of the
199. Id. at 68-70.
200. Id. at 71.
201. 12 Va. App. 73, 402 S.E.2d 703 (1991).
202. 9 Va. App. 254, 386 S.E.2d 633 (1989); see Ryan, supra note 1, at 604.
203. Appalachian Power, 12 Va. App. at 74, 402 S.E.2d at 704.
204. Id. at 75-76, 402 S.E.2d at 704-05.
205. Id. at 75, 402 S.E.2d at 704.
206. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-82 (1982)).
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question because the question is capable of repetition if the panel
decision looms unresolved.07
Finding no basis in the record to support the contention that the
Board acted unreasonably in attempting to promulgate its water
quality standards or in prosecuting its appeals, the court denied
APCo's claim for attorneys' fees. 08
V. GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
The 1991 General Assembly passed legislation requiring any
party subject to a temporary or permanent environmental injunc-
tion to demonstrate financial capability to comply with the injunc-
tion.209 The legislation applies only when a court has awarded an
injunction to the Commonwealth requiring that a party abate, con-
trol, prevent, remove, or contain any substantial or imminent
threat to the public health or the environment, or develop a clo-
sure plan to address such a threat that might result when a facility
ceases operation.21 0
The 1991 General Assembly also established the Virginia Envi-
ronmental Emergency Response Fund to be created from civil pen-
alties and charges imposed on persons who violate regulations and
orders of the State Water Control Board, Department of Air Pollu-
tion Control, or the Department of Waste Management.2 11 The
fund is to be used to respond to environmental pollution incidents
and to develop and implement corrective actions. Administration
and disbursement of money from the fund is to be made by the
State Comptroller at the written request of the department heads
of the Department of Air Pollution Control, the Department of
Waste Management, and the State Water Control Board. Requests
exceeding $100,000 must be approved by the Governor.212
The 1992 General Assembly passed legislation authorizing the
creation of the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) by
consolidating programs, functions, and staff of the State Water
207. Appalachian Power, 12 Va. App. at 75-76 n.1, 402 S.E.2d at 705 n.1.
208. Id. at 77, 402 S.E.2d at 705-06.
209. Act of Mar. 15, 1991, ch. 236, 1991 Va. Acts 335 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
631.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
210. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-631.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
211. Act of Apr. 3, 1991, ch. 718, 1991 Va. Acts 1393 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-
2500 to -2502 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2502 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
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Control Board, Department of Air Pollution Control, Department
of Waste Management and Council on the Environment.213 Effec-
tive April 1, 1993, the various boards and departments are to be
consolidated to enable coordination of permit review and issuance
procedures, development of uniform administrative systems, and
coordination of state reviews with federal agencies. The DEQ is
empowered to implement all regulations adopted by the boards
and to administer funds appropriated for environmental
programs.214
Under the new legislation, state agencies will be required to sub-
mit environmental impact reports on all major state projects to the
DEQ.215 Within sixty days of receipt of the report, the DEQ will be
required to review the report and submit a statement to the Gover-
nor regarding the environmental impact of the project.1 6 Approval
of the Governor will be required for the funding of a major state
project.217
213. Act of Apr. 15, 1992, ch. 887, 1992 Va. Acts 1667 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-
1182 to -1192 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
214. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1183 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
215. Id. § 10.1-1188. A major state project is defined as any project costing $100,000 or
more. Id.
216. Id. § 10.1-1189.
217. Id. § 10.1-1190.
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